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Abstract
The gauge/gravity duality and its relation to the possible emergence (in some
sense) of gravity from quantum physics has been much discussed. Recently,
however, Sebastian De Haro (2017) has argued that the very notion of a duality
precludes emergence, given what he calls the internal view of dualities, on which
the dual theories are physically equivalent. However, I argue that De Haro’s
argument for the internal view is not convincing, and we do not have good reasons
to adopt it. In turn, I propose we adopt the external view, on which dual theories
are not physically equivalent, instead.
1 Introduction
The gauge/gravity duality has generated much discussion about whether space-time
geometry or gravity emerges (in some sense) from quantum physics.1 Recently, however,
De Haro [2017] has argued that the very notion of a duality precludes the possibility of
emergence given what he calls the internal view of dualities, on which dual theories are
physically equivalent. In turn, this claim impinges upon the broader debate about
whether we can make claims about emergence given a duality. After all, since the
internal view of dualities is supposed to rule out emergence, any such debate is rendered
moot once we adopt the internal view. My goal here, though, is to argue that De Haro’s
argument for the internal view is not convincing. Instead, I propose we adopt the
external view of dualities, on which dual theories are not physically equivalent.
First, I introduce Fraser’s [2017] three-pronged distinction of predictive, formal and
physical equivalences, characterizing dualities in terms of this distinction (§2.1). I then
make things more concrete by briefly considering the gauge/gravity duality via the
Ryu-Takayanagi conjecture from the AdS/CFT (anti-de Sitter space/conformal field
theory) correspondence (§2.2).
Next, I introduce De Haro’s interpretive fork between the internal and external views
of dualities (§3). I illustrate how the internal view is supposed to preclude emergence,
but criticize De Haro’s argument for the internal view – that it is meaningless to hold
the external view given ‘some form of’ structural realism and how the two theories are
1One prominent physicist who is a proponent of emergent space-time is Seiberg 2007,
while philosophers like Rickles 2011/2017, Teh 2013, and Crowther 2014 have all tackled
the topic.
‘totalizing’ in some way – by showing how it does not work without further assumptions
(§4). In turn, given the interpretive fork, I propose we adopt the external view instead.
In concluding remarks, I briefly discuss this result in relation to the broader debate
about emergence within the gauge/gravity duality.
2 Gauge/Gravity through AdS/CFT
2.1 Duality
Fraser [2017] takes two theories related by a duality to have two features: (i) they agree
on the transition amplitudes and mass spectra, and (ii) there is a ‘translation manual’
that allows us to transform a description given by one theory to a description given by
another theory. We may explicate (i) and (ii) by first considering distinct sorts of
‘equivalence’ proposed by Fraser [2017, 35]:
• Predictive equivalence: “there is a map from T1 to T2 that preserves the values of
all expectation values deemed to have empirical significance by T1 and that
preserves the mass spectra, and vice versa.”
• Formal equivalence: “there is a translation manual from T1 to T2 which maps all
quantum states and quantum observables deemed to have physical significance by
T1 into quantities in T2 and respects predictive equivalence, and vice versa.”
• Physical equivalence: “there is a map from T1 to T2 that maps each physically
significant quantity in T1 to a quantity in T2 with the same physical interpretation
and respects both formal and predictive equivalence, and vice versa.”
Given our characterization of a duality as (i) and (ii), we may quite naturally say that
two theories are dual to one another when they are predictively and formally equivalent.
Furthermore, supposing that this three-pronged distinction exhausts the possible
equivalences relevant to physics, we might also say that two theories satisfying (i)-(iii)
are also fully, or theoretically, equivalent.
Here it would be germane to differentiate two distinct sorts of structures in a duality.
Given predictive and formal equivalence, the isomorphism holding between physical and
empirical quantities of the dual theories suggests a structure, which may be called the
empirical core of the duality. However, as Teh [2013, 301] also notes, despite the
empirical core, “duality is precisely an equivalence between two theories that describe (in
general) different physical structures, i.e. theories with non-isomorphic models.” In other
words, while there is an empirical core, by which physical and empirical quantities are
mapped onto one another, these quantities are generally related to other quantities in a
quite different manner on each side, viz. there is ‘excess structure’ exogenous to the
empirical core. Without further argument, we are not entitled to ‘discard’ this ‘excess
structure’, which also means that predictive and formal equivalence (characterizing the
empirical core) does not automatically entail physical, and hence full, equivalence.
Given Fraser’s framework, I will briefly introduce the gauge/gravity duality more
concrete by briefly examining the example of AdS/CFT correspondence.
2.2 The AdS/CFT Correspondence
The gauge/gravity duality, or holographic principle, postulates a duality between a
suitably chosen N -dimensional gauge quantum field theory (QFT) that does not describe
gravity, and a quantum theory of gravity in (N+1 )-dimensional space-time (the ‘bulk’)
with an N -dimensional ‘boundary’, on which the gauge theory is defined. Hence the
slogan: gauge on the boundary, gravity in the bulk.
The AdS/CFT correspondence is a specific case of the gauge/gravity duality. On
the one hand, ‘AdS’ stands for anti-de Sitter space-time - a maximally symmetric
solution to the Einstein equations with a constant negative curvature and a negative
cosmological constant. More accurately, though, the ‘AdS’ in AdS/CFT
correspondence should be taken to refer to a string theory of quantum gravity defined on
a 5-dimensional AdS. ‘CFT’, on the other hand, refers to a quantum field theory with
scale (or conformal) invariance defined on the 4-dimensional boundary of the AdS. The
AdS-side theory is defined in the ‘bulk’, and the CFT-side theory is defined on the
‘boundary’ of the AdS space-time.
The AdS/CFT correspondence, then, refers to a postulated duality between the two
theories, satisfying (i) and (ii) from §2.1. (i) is satisfied given the postulate that bulk
fields propagating in the bulk are coupled to operators in the boundary CFT. Hence,
the AdS theory of gravity will predict exactly the ‘same physics’, viz. transition
amplitudes, expectation values and so on, as the CFT theory without gravity.
Beyond empirical, i.e. measurable, quantities, physically significant quantities of
AdS/CFT must also relate to one another since it is a duality. In other words, (ii) is
supposed to hold simply as a core postulate. This is not to say that (ii) is completely
unfounded: in particular, we have evidence suggesting that at least some physical
quantities of dual theories are related to one another in surprising ways, which in turn
supports the claim that (ii) holds. Here I will focus on one such relation, the
Ryu-Takayanagi conjecture.
The Ryu-Takayanagi conjecture postulates that the entanglement entropy of two




RT tells us that the entanglement entropy of a region on the boundary of the AdS, SA,
viz. the von Neumann entropy3 in the CFT, is directly proportionate (by 4 times the
Newtonian gravitational constant) to the area of the boundary surface A˜ bisecting the
bulk, dividing the two entangled regions on the boundary. Below, Fig. 1. shows a
simplified diagram for visualizing RT.
Fig. 1. The area A˜ bisects the bulk space-time into two, and on the boundaries of the two parts we define the regions A
and B. The Ryu-Takayanagi formula tells us that given a change in SA we get a change in the size of A˜ by the proportion
of 1
4GN
. [Figure taken from Van Raamsdonk 2010]
RT paints an interesting picture for emergence of space-time geometry from quantum
theory: the area of a space-time itself is closely related to quantum entanglement
entropy in a surprising way. An increase in the entanglement entropy between two
2See Ryu & Takayanagi 2006 for technical details.
3The von Neumann entropy is given by SA = −Tr(ρAlogρA). The reduced density
matrix describing the region A, ρA, is obtained from tracing over the B -components of
the combined density matrix of A and the entangled region B, ρAB: ρA = TrB(ρAB).
regions of a field described by CFT leads to a proportionately increasing boundary area
of the bulk, and hence a geometric (or gravitational) phenomenon is described in terms
of a quantum phenomenon.4
Given relations like RT, we can also see more clearly how AdS/CFT is supposed to
satisfy (ii): physically significant quantities, such as ‘area’ of space-time in the bulk and
‘entanglement entropy’ between two regions on the boundary, are mapped to one another
via suitable equations. Hence, AdS/CFT is a special case of the gauge/gravity duality:
a theory of quantum gravity on a (N+1 )-dimensional AdS space-time is dual to a CFT
defined on its N -dimensional boundary.
With the gauge/gravity duality made concrete, let us turn to the interpretive task.
3 The Internal View
Dieks et al. [2015] and De Haro [2017] proposes an interpretive fork for dualities: we can
either adopt an internal or external view. De Haro describes the internal view as such:
if the meaning of the symbols is not fixed beforehand, then the two theories,
related by the duality, can describe the same physical quantities. [...] we have
two formulations of one theory, not two theories. [De Haro 2017, 116]
On the contrary, the external view holds that:
the interpretative apparatus for the entire theory is fixed on each side. [...]
On this interpretation there is only a formal/theoretical, but no empirical,
equivalence between the two theories, as they clearly use different physical
4See Van Raamsdonk 2010 for an excellent summary of this picture.
quantities; only one of them can adequately describe the relevant empirical
observations.
Is De Haro’s characterization of the external view adequate? The fact that there is no
‘empirical’ equivalence (what Fraser calls physical equivalence) between two theories
does not entail that at most one of them can adequately describe the relevant empirical
observations, where one description is ’correct’ and the other ’wrong’, nor does it entail
mutually exclusive physics where only one theory can be correct at any one time. To
assume so seems to rule out, by fiat, the possibility of emergence, since emergence relies
on both theories being in a way adequately descriptive of the world (except one is more
‘fundamental’ than the other). Hence, taking in account Fraser’s framework, I
re-characterize the external view as such: it is simply the claim that the two dual
theories are physically non-equivalent i.e. have distinct physical interpretations, despite
formal and predictive equivalence.
Given the interpretive fork, if we are led to forsake the internal view, then we are
motivated to accept the external view instead. As such, my strategy here is to show that
we should forsake the internal view, and in turn accept the external view instead.
To better understand what the internal view is claiming, I break it down into three
constituent claims.
The first claim is that of theoretical equivalence: under the gauge/gravity duality, the
two theories (e.g. AdS and CFT) are taken to be simply different formulations of a
single theory, describing the same physical quantities despite their obvious differences.
As Dieks et al. puts it, ‘the two theories collapse into one’ [2015, 209-210]. In light of
Fraser’s framework described in §2.3, this claim means that the gauge/gravity duality, on
the internal view, involves the conjunction of predictive, formal and physical
equivalences. In other words, beyond a one-to-one mapping (a ’translation manual’) of
relevant physical quantities and the sharing of all transition amplitudes, mass spectra
and other observable predictions, the internal view claims that the two theories also have
the same physical interpretation. However, as Fraser [2017, 35] notes, “predictive
equivalence does not entail formal equivalence, and formal equivalence does not entail
physical equivalence.” Formal and predictive equivalence cannot entail physical
equivalence on their own.
The internal view’s claim of theoretical equivalence, then, must require an additional
claim of physical equivalence, in addition to formal and predictive equivalence: the dual
theories are taken to be physically equivalent, and hence have the same physical
interpretation. As per §2.1, this would indeed entail theoretical equivalence.
Physical equivalence is in turn justified by a third claim, that the two theories in a
duality should be left uninterpreted. As De Haro claims above, assume ‘the meaning of
the symbols is not fixed beforehand’. Then, given formal and predictive equivalence, we
have an isomorphism between the dual theories’ (now-uninterpreted) ‘physical
quantities’ and numerical predictions, viz. an uninterpreted empirical core. Ignoring the
‘excess structure’ exogenous to the empirical core, we can then take the empirical core to
be representing a single uninterpreted theory, where the now-uninterpreted ’quantities’ of
each dual theory now refer to the ‘places’ or ‘nodes’ of the empirical core’s structure. As
Dieks et al. (2015) puts it,
A in one theory will denote exactly the same physical quantity as B [...] if
these quantities occupy structurally identical nodes in their respective webs
of observables and assume the same (expectation) values. [Dieks et al. 2015,
209]
Now, given this situation, it might seem plausible to claim that the dual theories are
really physically equivalent. Consider RT. On the internal view, we are led to say that
‘area’ really has the same meaning as ‘entanglement entropy’. After all, in the
theoretical structure that is supposed to matter on the internal view, viz. the empirical
core, the two terms are related structurally in the same way to other terms elsewhere
(sans a proportional constant). Given that the two theories is also stripped of all prior
physical meaning, this structural identity suggests that the ‘area’ and ‘entanglement
entropy’ are really describing the same quantities, despite their obvious non-isomorphism
more generally (e.g. different equations in computing these quantities in their respective
theories, the terms involved in calculating them, and so on). In other words, it seems
that we are allowed to proclaim physical equivalence on this view.
If we do accept this third claim, we get physical and hence theoretical equivalence,
and so the internal view does preclude the possibility of emergence: Theoretical
equivalence effectively rules out any account of emergence. If the two dual theories are
really just different formulations of one theory, then there is nothing for this new,
unified, theory to emerge from: nothing can emerge from itself in any interesting way.
Subsequently, a duality is supposed to preclude emergence on the internal view.
Agreed: physical equivalence entails theoretical equivalence, and theoretical
equivalence rules out any sort of emergence. However, are we forced to adopt physical
equivalence given the internal view? De Haro himself seems unclear on this point. Note
the use of “can” in his characterization of the internal view above: “the two theories,
related by the duality, can describe the same physical quantities” [2017, 116, emphasis
mine]. Are we supposed to believe that physical equivalence can hold, or that it must
hold, on the internal view? In other words, since physical equivalence hangs on the third
claim of leaving terms of the dual theories uninterpreted, must we adopt the third claim,
or is it merely possible?
De Haro seems to suggest that theoretical, and hence physical, equivalence must hold,
since he assumes the two dual theories to be ‘two formulations of one theory ’ [emphasis
mine]. However, later on, he suggests that physical equivalence merely can hold, when he
considers an example of leaving dual theories uninterpreted beyond structural relations:
For what might intuitively be interpreted as a ‘length, a reinterpretation in
terms of ‘renormalisation group scale is now available.5 [De Haro 2017, 116,
emphasis mine]
The availability of an interpretative stance – in our case of RT, of interpreting bulk
boundary surface area to be the same physical quantity as entanglement entropy – surely
does not entail the necessity of the stance. Hence, there are two readings of the internal
view: on the weak reading, we take the modal talk – e.g. a reinterpretation being
‘available’ or how we ‘can’ describe the same physical quantities – seriously, and on the
strong reading we ignore the modal talk completely.
On the one hand, the claim that the internal view precludes emergence is not true on
the weaker view. On this view, if we assume that the terms on both sides of the duality
are uninterpreted, then there is no emergence; but this is not forced on us. In turn, this
5For context, though unmentioned in this paper, length and renormalisation group
scale are also dual quantities in AdS/CFT.
makes the preclusion of emergence merely possible. However, this reading of the internal
view does not rule out emergence as De Haro claims. I will thus assume that De Haro
intends for us to take the strong reading of the internal view, which does claim that the
terms of the both sides are uninterpreted.
However, we have not yet seen a compelling reason for accepting the claim that we
have to see the terms of the dual theories as uninterpreted, and subsequently that
physical equivalence must hold. A fortiori we are not obliged to accept the internal view.
Indeed, something is odd about the argument structure I mapped out: To establish
the second claim of physical equivalence, we must establish the third claim, that we must
discard anything beyond the empirical core and to leave the terms uninterpreted.
However, to justify leaving the terms uninterpreted requires a convincing argument for
assuming physical equivalence between the two theories to begin with! Otherwise, we
have no reason to simply discard the ‘excess’ structure and leave the dual theories’ terms
uninterpreted.
Hence, further arguments are required to establish the third claim. Furthermore, if
we discover that this argument is wanting, we shall then have reasons to reject the
internal view.
4 De Haro’s Argument
De Haro does provide an argument, which runs on the idea that two plausible
commitments entails the internal view: the commitment that the dual theories are
theories of the whole world in some suitably totalizing manner, and the commitment to
“some form of structural realism” [2017, 116].
Let us begin by examining the two commitments. The first commitment implies that
dual theories are theories of the whole world, in the sense that they are “both candidate
descriptions of the same world” [Dieks et al. 2015, 14]. However, prima facie this is not
true, since on one hand we have a theory of gravity/space-time geometry, while on the
other we have a theory without (not to mention different dimensionalities). How can two
theories, one describing something the other does not, both be about the same world?
We can try to make this assumption intelligible by taking into account the translation
manual between the two theories. Given the translation manual, we can claim that the
CFT theory without gravity does describe gravity in a way. Consider RT: while the
entanglement entropy described within CFT does not appear to describe space-time
geometry by itself, the CFT plus the translation manual and AdS (in this case RT)
does describe space-time geometry, albeit in a higher-dimensional space-time. When the
entanglement described within the CFT changes, the boundary surface area in the
AdS-side theory with gravity changes as well. Hence, by considering the translation
manual given by the duality, the first commitment is made plausible.
The second commitment requires us to adopt some form of structural realism.
Structural realism here can be understood loosely, since nothing turns on the particular
account of structural realism we employ. Furthermore, De Haro himself does not specify
precisely what he means by ‘some form of’ structural realism. As such, I will likewise
adopt a loose notion of structural realism: I understand it to be the view that we should
be (metaphysically or epistemically) committed only to the mathematical or formal
structure of our theories, and this entails, among other things, that theoretical terms are
to be defined in terms of their relations to other places or nodes in this formal structure.
Now, De Haro then claims that the two commitments entail the internal view:
If [the two commitments] are met, it is impossible, in fact meaningless, to
decide that one formulation of the theory is superior, since both theories are
equally successful by all epistemic criteria one should apply. [De Haro 2017,
116]
Since he does not flesh out his argument in much detail, I attempt to reconstruct his
argument in a plausible fashion: firstly, let us grant the two commitments. Do these
commitments commit us to the conclusion that it is meaningless to differentiate between
the two dual theories?
Dieks et al. [2015, 209] claims that given the first commitment, “it is no longer clear
that there exists an ‘external’ point of view that independently fixes the meanings of
terms in the two theories”. However, I must admit I do not see why this is the case: as I
explained above, the first commitment only makes sense if we understand both theories
as having pre-determined meanings, and then relating them via the duality/translation
manual. In other words, the first commitment is perfectly compatible with the external
view.
For the remainder of this paper I focus on the second commitment instead. I think
the second commitment does entail that differentiating the two theories is meaningless,
only if we believe that one should be a structural realist (epistemically/metaphysically)
only about the empirical core of the duality, discarding the ‘excess structure’ which made
the two theories distinct structures to begin with. In other words, we want to say that
this ‘excess structure’ was not physically significant to begin with: only the empirical
core was relevant to physics. It seems that this is required to make sense of the claim
that it is ‘meaningless’ to say that one formulation, e.g. the CFT side, is better than the
other, e.g. the AdS side. If structural realism commits us only to the empirical core of
the dual theories, then accordingly there is really only one structure in question. Hence,
it is meaningless to ask which structure is better (there is only one). If there is only one
structure, then the internal view seems to hold: under a structural realist view, the
terms of the dual theories are defined in terms of their places in the structure. Hence,
within the empirical core’s structure, the different terms of the dual theories really mean
the same thing, and hence we get some version of the internal view.
Why should we, even as structural realists, commit ourselves only to the empirical
core? The argument seems to me to be an epistemic one: we should believe that the
structure relevant to the two theories given the duality must really be common to both
theories because, as De Haro claims above, “both theories are equally successful” by all
epistemic criteria we apply. If this is true then it seems we have no way of differentiating
between the two theories, and the best explanation for this epistemic equivalence is to
appeal to their being ‘the same’ in some way. The only thing in common between the
dual theories is the empirical core, so we should take this to be what explains their
epistemic equivalence. Everything else (i.e. the ‘excess structure’) can be discarded,
since they are irrelevant differences. As such, structural realism should commit us only
to the empirical core.
However, it is not clear that the dual theories are indeed epistemically equivalent. In
a naive sense, they are epistemically equivalent if one takes ‘epistemic’ to be ‘empirical’
equivalence. Given the duality, i.e. formal and predictive equivalence, it is trivial that
the two theories are also ‘empirically’ equivalent. However, I do not think such a notion
of empirical equivalence exhausts the epistemic criteria for differentiating between
scientific theories. Of course, one main desideratum for scientific theorizing is to provide
predictions, descriptions and explanations of phenomena. Beyond that, though, I contend
that another desideratum of scientific theorizing is to look for ways to develop better
scientific theories, be it a more unificatory theory, a more explanatory theory, and so on.
We see this in play when De Haro discusses the position/momentum duality in
quantum mechanics: “this duality is usually seen as teaching us something new about
the nature of reality: namely, that atoms are neither particles, nor waves. By analogy, it
is to be expected that gauge/gravity dualities teach us something about the nature of
spacetime and gravity” [2017, 117]. However, this is only possible if the two theories
were not epistemically equivalent! If they were epistemically equivalent, then how could
we learn anything new from one theory that we cannot already learn from another? If
’area’ and ’entanglement entropy’ really meant the same thing and had the same
physical interpretation, how could we learn something new when we realize that area can
be related (via RT) to quantum entanglement? Indeed, this criticism extends generally
to the internal view: how can we learn anything new from a duality if the dual theories
are just the ‘same theory’, and indeed are uninterpreted to begin with? We learn
something new when two different things are related in a surprising way, especially when
they are related to other quantities, on each side, in interesting ways; I do not see how
we can learn something new when one and the same thing is related to itself.
Furthermore, the two theories are not epistemically equivalent when we consider the
methodological concerns of physicists, who generally note that the CFT is
well-understood, while the dual string theory of gravity is not. For example, Horowitz
and Polchinski [2009] notes that we only approximately understand the gravitational
theory, but the CFT has been developed to very precise degrees. Lin points out that:
A dictionary is reasonably well developed in the direction of using
classical gravity to study the CFT, but the converse problem how to
organize the information in certain CFT’s into a theory of quantum gravity
with a semi-classical limit is hardly understood at all. [2015, 11]
If both theories are equally successful by all epistemic criteria we have, then this
situation should not appear. Rather, it seems that scientific practice is of the opinion
that the two theories are, in fact, not epistemically equal: one is more successful than
the other in terms of a variety of criteria, such as precision of calculation, ease of
understanding, availability of a non-perturbative analysis, and so on. It is one reason
why AdS/CFT is such an interesting area of research: it allows us to understand a
hard-to-understand theory in terms of an easier-to-understand theory. Unless one is
given arguments for why such criteria should not be epistemically relevant, the dual
theories, I contend, are not epistemically equivalent.
Of course, one could assume that the goal or ideal, when we fully understand the
translation manual, is to render both theories equally epistemically successful. However,
this presumes that both sides will end up being just as easy to compute, or understand,
and so on. Of course, if we do discover a more fundamental characterization of why the
two dual theories are related by the duality as such, e.g. the sort of ‘deeper’ theory
Rickles [2011, 2017] hopes for, then clearly we are entitled to the internal view since this
‘deeper’ theory will ideally explain why the dual theories, despite their apparent
differences, can be seen as different facets of a single theory, just like how special
relativity unified electromagnetism and made it plausible to understand both the electric
and magnetic fields as facets of the ‘deeper’ Faraday tensor field. Right now, though,
there is no such theory in sight, making this point inadequate for supporting the internal 
view.
Given the foregoing, it is not clear there is epistemic equivalence: the epistemic 
argument does not hold. The upshot is that we are not compelled to provide an 
explanation for why the dual theories are epistemically equivalent to begin with (they 
are not), and hence we have no need to commit ourselves only to the common empirical 
core, even as structural realists, nor to think that differentiating the dual theories is 
meaningless.
Recall the oddity I pointed out in §3, though. The claim of physical equivalence 
hangs on leaving the dual theories uninterpreted, but this latter claim was itself 
motivated by physical equivalence. It was hoped, then, that the epistemic argument 
could provide independent motivation for adopting physical equivalence. Given my 
criticism of De Haro’s additional argument, though, the circle returns, and leaves the two 
claims uncompelling. Hence, we should not adopt the internal view itself. Furthermore, 
my criticisms suggest that the dual theories are in fact not epistemically equivalent, and 
this suggests that the default stance is one where the two theories are not theoretically 
equivalent at all. Given the duality, the only way this can be so is to adopt the view 
that the dual theories are physically non-equivalent; in other words we should adopt the 
external view instead.
To conclude, given the dialectic set up by the interpretive fork, and the inadequacies 
of the internal view, I suggest that we adopt the external view instead.
5 The Way Forward
Let me end by commenting on the external view and the broader debate on whether 
there is emergence given a duality (§1). In §3 we have seen how the internal view 
precludes emergence simply because there are no two distinct theories to speak of: we 
merely have two ways of looking at a single theory. This in turn swiftly rules out any 
talk of emergence. The external view, though, does not rule out emergence quite so 
easily, and there is some leeway to speak of emergence since we do have two distinct 
theories which are, as Teh noted, generically not isomorphic to one another. However, 
given the formal and predictive equivalences demanded by a duality relation, a duality 
relation is symmetric, and so there is nothing within a duality that will formally broker 
the asymmetry between two theories we often associate with emergence. One way to do 
so, as Teh (2013) suggests, is to introduce a claim of relative fundamentality, i.e. which 
theory is ’more fundamental’ than another, is required to break the symmetry and 
provide us with the required asymmetry for emergence. While the external view does not 
entail this, it does not rule it out either. Hence, the external view does not preclude 
emergence; instead, it directs attention about emergence and duality away from the 
interpretative fork, onto whether and how one can make claims about relative 
fundamentality in the context of dualities. Alas, this requires much more attention than 
I can afford here: I leave it for another day.
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